Defining Critical Infrastructure for a Global Application by Newbill, Colleen M
Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 
Volume 26 Issue 2 Article 11 
Summer 8-1-2019 
Defining Critical Infrastructure for a Global Application 
Colleen M. Newbill 
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, cnewbill@iu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Internet Law 
Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National Security Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Newbill, Colleen M. (2019) "Defining Critical Infrastructure for a Global Application," Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies: Vol. 26 : Iss. 2 , Article 11. 
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol26/iss2/11 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Digital 
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please 
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu. 
Defining Critical Infrastructure for a Global 
Application 
COLLEEN M. NEWBILI.: 
ABSTRACT 
A Google search for the phrase "critical infrastructure" turns up 189
million results in little more than a half second: ''global critical 
infrastructure" has 151 million results; and "definition of critical 
infrastructure" yields 71.5 million results. The list of what industries 
and sectors fall under the critical infrastructure designation expands as 
time progresses and technology develops. As the threat of cyberattacks 
increases and this frontier of terrorism continues to emerge, attacks on 
critical infrastructure are high on the list of concerns and the need for 
protective measures imperative. The focus on protecting critical 
infrastructure does not stop at the borders of individual nation-states as 
calls for international efforts to protect national critical infrastructures 
are being made. Without clearly defined boundaries on what constitutes 
critical infrastructure at a global level, however, international efforts to 
protect critical infrastructure will be unduly burdensome and overbroad. 
Before moving toward international efforts for protecting critical 
infrastructure, the global community must come together to define which 
critical infrastructures are worth this additional level of protection. 
INTRODUCTION 
The last decade has seen the rise of the nation -state as a malicious 
actor in cyberspace. The lone hacker or activist group perpetrating 
cyber-vandalism or theft is no longer the image of an enemy on the 
other side of the screen when addressing cybersecurity. The threat now 
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lies in state-sponsored hacking and cyberattacks. In 2010, the United 
States and Israel launched a computer worm that damaged centrifuges 
used to purify uranium in Iranian nuclear facilities. 1 Four years later, 
in an unprecedented move of charging state actors from another 
country, the U.S. Department of Justice filed indictments against five 
members of the People's Liberation Army for "computer hacking, 
economic espionage and other offenses" conducted against U.S. 
companies in various industries, including nuclear power plants and 
energy companies.2 The following year, North Korea was identified as 
the party behind the cyberattack on Sony Pictures, where hackers stole 
confidential data and subsequently released the information online.3 
Nation-state actors have launched attacks against both civilian and 
military targets via cyberspace, making an already challenging 
situation worse. 
In February 2017, Brad Smith, president of Microsoft, gave the 
keynote address at the Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman Conference in San 
Francisco, California. The topic of his address was the problem of 
cybersecurity and the need for new solutions. 4 One of the major 
complications in creating new solutions is this new role of the nation­
state actor as a threat and not a target. 5 Cyberspace is the new frontline 
of battle, but unlike prior battlefields that progressed from land to sea 
to air, 6 cyberspace is not a physical place. 7 Furthermore, cyberspace is 
not a sovereign territory that is protected by borders under the 
authority of the nation-state, but is rather often controlled by the 
private sector.8 The premise of Smith's address is that this new frontline 
has nation-states attacking civilians and the private sectors rather than 
other government actors, and because of this shift, civilians are often 
1. David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y.
TIMES (June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/0l/world/middleeast/obama­
ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?pagewanted=l&_r=l&hp. 
2. Press Release, DEp'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for
Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial 
Advantage (May 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese­
military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor; see also Evan Perez 
& Shimon Prokupecz, U.S. Plans to Publicly Blame Iran for Dam Cyber Breach, CNN 
(Mar. 10, 2016, 5:35 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/10/politics/iran-us-dam-cyber­
attack/index.html. 
3. Perez & Prokupecz, supra note 2; see also Kim Zetter, Sony Got Hacked Hard,
WIRED (Dec. 3, 2014, 4:02 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know/. 
4. Brad Smith, President and Chief Legal Officer, Microsoft, Keynote Address at the 
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the first responders.9 Smith calls for the world's governments to come 
together to protect civilians like they did when the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 were drafted. 10 Unlike the Geneva Conventions that were 
established to protect civilians during times of war, however, Smith 
believes the world's governments need to unite to protect civilians on 
the Internet in times of peace. 11 
Smith proposes the creation of a "Digital Geneva Convention" to 
ensure civilian protection on the internet and in cyberspace during 
times of peace; he calls for world governments to pledge not to engage in 
specific behaviors that threaten civilians and to work together with the 
private sector to respond to threats that do occur.12 The proposal lays 
out six objectives: (1) "no targeting of tech companies, private sector, or 
critical infrastructure"; (2) "assist private sector efforts to detect, 
contain, respond to, and recover from" cyberattacks; (3) "report 
vulnerabilities to vendors"; (4) "exercise restraint in developing cyber 
weapons"; (5) "commit to nonproliferation activities to cyberweapons"; 
and (6) ''limit offensive operation." 13 The purpose of these objectives is 
that, under such a convention, the world's governments "will not target 
civilian infrastructure, whether it's of the electrical or the economic or 
the political variety."14 
This proposal is not the only call for international action to address 







15. In November 2018, at the UNESCO Internet Governance Forum, French President
Emmanuel Macron announced an international initiative between more than fifty 
countries, ninety nonprofit groups and universities, and over a hundred corporations. 
Louise Matsakis, The U.S. Sits Out an Internatwnal Cybersecurity Agreement, WIRED
(Nov. 12, 2018, 7:37 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/paris-call-cybersecurity-united­
states-microsoftJ. The Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace has been described 
as being "akin to a Geneva Convention for the digital world." Id. In the agreement, the 
signatories have affirmed a "willingness to work together . . and to assist on another" to 
(1) "Prevent and recover from malicious cyber activities that threaten or cause significant,
indiscriminate or systemic harm to individuals and critical infrastructure;" (2) "Prevent
activity that intentionally and substantially damages the general availability or integrity
of the public core of the Internet;" (3) "Strengthen our capacity to prevent malign
interference by foreign actors aimed at undermining electoral processes through malicious
cyber activities;" (4) ''Prevent !CT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade
secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive
advantages to companies or commercial sector;" (5) "Develop ways to prevent the
proliferation of malicious ICT tools and practices intended to cause harm;" (6) "Strengthen
the security of digital processes, products and services, throughout their lifecycle and
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both civilians and other nation-states, calls for a convention or 
agreement between world governments will increase. 16 However, the 
idea of a Digital Geneva Convention stipulating behaviors to be adhered 
to during times of peace is not without its issues. It may create new 
vulnerabilities in national security or encroach on nation-state 
sovereignty, but those concerns are outside the scope of this note. This 
note takes a closer look at the proposal's first principle and focuses on 
the idea of protecting critical infrastructure within the bounds of a 
potential Digital Geneva Convention. While the general principle of 
what constitutes critical infrastructure is similar across borders, there 
is not a single, global definition. For a Digital Geneva Convention to be 
effective, there must be some degree of global uniformity as to what 
constitutes critical infrastructure. Because the priorities of different 
countries can vary as to what is considered critical, a second definition 
for critical infrastructure is necessary. 
The purpose of this note is to address the need for and propose a 
second definition of critical infrastructure in an application such as a 
Digital Geneva Convention. Part two of this note will address how 
critical infrastructure has been defined historically and in the physical 
world. It will also look at the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and how they 
supply chain;" (7) "Support efforts to strengthen an advanced cyber hygiene for all actors;" 
(8) "Take soops to prevent non-State actors, including the privaoo sector, from hacking­
back, for their own purposes or those of other non-State actors;" and (9) "Promote the 
widespread acceptance and implementation of inoornational norms of responsible behavior 
as well as confidence-building measures in cyberspace." Paris Call for Trust and Security 
in Cyberspace, Nov. 12, 2018, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/lMG/pdf/paris_call_text_­
_en_cle06f9l8.pdf. These goals map onto the principles outlined by Brad Smith, but like
his proposal, there are no explicitly defined oorms to make these goals a reality. While the 
Paris Call is one of the first steps toward inoornational efforts in cybersecurity, the lack of 
concret;e terms highlights why constructing a global definition for critical infrastructure is 
necessary.
16. See generally Rihards Kols, Cyberspace Needs Its Own 'Geneva Convention',
RIHARDS KOLS (Sept. 20, 2017), http://www.rihardskols.lv/r-kols-cyberspace-needs-its-own­
geneva-convention/ (explaining the need for international cooperation in addressing 
cyberspace as a new military sphere); Jovan Kurbalija, Digital Geneva Convention: 
Multilateral Treaty, Multistaker Implementation, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 2017, 10:35 
AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/digital-geneva-convention-multilateral-treaty­
multistakeholder_us_58b443c0e4b02f3f8le44a35 (discussing Brad Smith's proposal for a 
digital Geneva Convention and its implementation); Teri Robinson, A Cyber Geneva 
Convention, SC MEDIA (May 1, 2017), https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security­
news/features/a-cyber-geneva-convention/ (analyzing Brad Smith's proposal within the 
context of the rules of engagement). But see Jonathon Keane, A Digital Geneva Convention 
Will Only Go So Far, PASTE (May 19, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.pastemagazine.com 
/articles/2017/05/a-digital-geneva-convention-for-cybercrime-will-on.html (discussing the 
inoornational agreements already in existence to govern cyberspace and the need for an 
independent body to enforce and investigate violations of a digital Geneva Convention). 
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applied to infrastructure to protect civilians. Next, part three will look 
at how modern critical infrastructure has been defined and how the rise 
of the internet and networking systems together has affected the 
definition. Finally, part four will propose a global definition of critical 
infrastructure and what underlying criteria should be considered. 
HISTORY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
OF 1949 
While the term "critical infrastructure" may not have been used to 
describe systems vital to a nation's functioning, such systems have 
always been in place. The protection and targeting of these systems are 
often viewed from a national security perspective and how they affect 
the nation-state's ability to function. Critical infrastructure, whether by 
that name or another, however, has served civilians first and foremost. 
A Brief History of Critical Infrastructure and Its Role from Civilian and 
Military Perspectives 
Critical infrastructure dates as far back as ancient Rome and 
Greece. The Roman Empire has been recognized throughout history for 
its road systems, food stores, and aqueducts. 17 Rome's aqueducts were 
"critical to ancient Roman civilization and its evolution from a regional 
power into a vast empire."18 These systems were deemed 
"indispensable"19 and as such were protected and hidden to protect the 
Roman water system from external threats.20 While the aqueducts were 
made to serve the civilian population, they were also an advantage 
militarily and thus a target for attacking forces. When Rome began to 
build the aqueducts above ground, the purpose of the infrastructure 
changed from being "a hidden and purpose-build system that delivered 
an essential service into a 'visible' symbol of greatness through the use 
of technology."21 This shift in purpose, however, made the water 
system's infrastructure vulnerable. These systems were then exploited 
by Rome's enemies, and the water supply was disrupted until 
eventually, the only aqueducts left were the original, underground 
17. Michael J. Assante, Idaho Nat'l Lab., Proceedings of the 42nd Hawaii International




19. Id. at 2. 
20. Id. at 3.
21. Id.
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aqueducts.22 
Often an opposing force attacks a critical infrastructure to weaken 
not only the military forces but also the general population as well. For 
example, the seizure of Hellespont, the source of grain imports for 
Athens in ancient Greece, resulted in the starvation of the city and 
Athens' subsequent defeat at Aegospotami.23 To protect Hellespont, 
Athens sent over thirty-five thousand men to prevent the strait from 
being closed and the grain from being seized. 24 
Food and water supplies are not the only early forms of critical 
infrastructure that were targeted. Means of transportation were also 
often targeted. During World War II, the Allied forces bombed 
Germany's railway system, which ultimately halted the delivery of 
goods and brought the German economy to the brink of collapsing. 25 
Attacks on vital systems go far beyond affecting a nation's government 
or military operations and often have devastating effects on civilian 
populations. 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protecting Civilians in Times of 
War 
In August 1949, the four Geneva Conventions were signed by 
eighteen government delegations.26 As of the early 2000s, 194 nation­
states had become parties to the Geneva Conventions.27 These 
conventions were created and ratified after World War II in response to 
the violent acts committed against victims and civilians during the 
war.28 Philip Spoerri, International Committee of the Red Cross 
Director for International Law and Cooperation, stated in his address 
commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions that the "basic notion underlying the Geneva Conventions 
22. Id. at 3-4.
23. See KATHI ANN BROWN, CRITICAL PATH: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES, at xiv (2006) (reviewing the hist.ory 
of the Spartan capture of Hellespont). 
24. See generally JOHN R. HALE, L()RDS OF THE SEA (2009) (explaining the story of 
Sparta's attack on Hellespont in Greek history). 
25. BROWN, supra note 23, at xiv-xv.
26. See Philip Spoerri, Director of International Law, ICRC, The Geneva Conventions 
of 1949: Origins and Current Significance (Dec. 8, 2009), https://www.icrc.org/eng/ 
resources/documents/statementlgeneva-conventions-statement-120809.htm. 
27. Id.; see also Treaties, State Parti,es and Commentaries, ICRC (last visited Nov. 10, 
2018), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_treatySelected=380& 
xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties. 
28. See Spoerri, supra note 26.
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is the notion of respect for the life and dignity of the individual."29 
The Fourth Geneva Convention (Convention IV) specifically deals 
with the treatment of civilians during times of war and provides 
regulations for the general security of populations and protected 
persons.3° The idea of respect for the life and dignity of the individual is
reflected in Part I of Convention IV; it prohibits distinctions in 
treatment based on "race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth," 
"violence to life and person," "taking of hostages," behaviors that 
degrade personal dignity, and extrajudicial sentences and executions.31
Convention IV focuses more on the protection of human rights for 
civilians during war rather than attempting to ban violence against 
civilians. 
Additional protections for civilians were granted through the 
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention in 1977 (the Additional 
Protocols). 32 Part IV of the Additional Protocols discusses rules related
to the civilian population. 33 While the Additional Protocols continue to
focus on human rights, Part IV also explicitly addresses the use of force. 
Article 49 of the Additional Protocols defines an attack as "acts of 
violence against the adversary, whether in offense or in defense."34 It
prohibits "[a]cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to 
spread terror among the civilian population .... "35
The Additional Protocols further deem any attack "which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated " as indiscriminate. 36 While the definition of an attack is
accepted international law, some legal scholars have suggested that an 
act must inflict harm to be considered an attack.37 This idea is 
supplemented by the Additional Protocols' prohibited attacks. These 
rules are "necessarily ill-defined and 'no objective standards exist as to 
29. Id.
30. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (detailing the limits of warfare in order to 
protect civilians during times of war) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
31. Id. art. 3. 
32. See generally Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, Aug. 12, 1949 
(extending additional protections to civilians and protected people during times of war) 
[hereinafter Protocols]. 
33. See generally id. pt. IV (describing the protections granted specifically to civilian
populations). 
34. Id. art. 49. 
35. Id. art. 51, cl. 2. 
36. Id. art. 51, cl. 5(b). 
37. Sasha Romanosky & Zackary Goldman, Understanding Cyber Collateral Damage, 9
J. NAT'L SECURITYL. & POL'Y 233, 241 (2017).
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where this turning point lies;' determinations are by necessity fact­
bound."38 
Both Convention IV and the Additional Protocols protect civilian 
systems and places. Although "critical infrastructure" is not found 
within the four corners of either document, there are regulations 
pertaining to the protection of civilian hospitals;39 medical transport;40 
and passage of medical supplies, food, and clothing.41 The Additional 
Protocols bar attacks on "civilian objects," which further added 
protections for locations that civilians are likely to frequent, such as 
places of worship and schools. 42 Article 54 explicitly prohibits targeting 
and destroying "objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population," such as water systems and agricultural areas. 43 Finally, the 
Additional Protocols include protections of those systems that, if 
destroyed, would likely cause severe loss to the civilian population. 44 
These include military installations and dams, which are protected if 
their destruction would release "dangerous forces" that would 
negatively affect civilians. 45 These civilian systems and places have been 
incorporated into what are now deemed "critical infrastructures" of 
many nation-states. 
MODERN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE DIGITAL LANDSCAPE 
Modern Definitions of and Approaches to Critical Infrastructures 
From the earliest societies establishing roads and governments to 
the modern idea of interdependent utilities and financial systems, what 
constitutes a country's critical infrastructure changes as society's needs 
shift and technology advances.46 Modern definitions of what systems 
constitute critical infrastructure ultimately vary little from one nation­
state to another, but the prioritization within each system may differ 
greatly. It has been noted that "[c]omponents of one infrastructure . .. 
can differ markedly in their criticality to the survival of the overall 
system"47; thus, non-essential systems are incorporated into the critical 
38. Id. 
39. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 30 at art. 18.
40. Id. art. 21-22.
41. Id. art. 23.
42. Protocols, supra note 32, art. 52.
43. Id. art. 54.
44. Id. art. 56.
45. Id. art. 56, cl. 1.
46. See generally BROWN, supra note 23 (detailing the history of critical infrastructure
in the United States). 
47. Id. at 9.
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infrastructure while excluding some vital sectors. How nation-states 
define and prioritize these systems is critical to creating a globally 
applicable definition of critical infrastructure. 
U.S. policy defined critical infrastructure for the first time in 1996. 48 
In Executive Order 13010, President Bill Clinton stated that certain 
national infrastructures were "so vital that their incapacity or 
destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic 
security of the United States" and established a commission to develop a 
strategy to protect such systems from attack. 49 The Executive Order 
then categorizes the potential threats, stating "[t]hreats to these critical 
infrastructures fall into two categories: physical threats to tangible 
property ("physical threats"), and threats of electronic, radio-frequency, 
or computer-based attacks on the information or communications 
components that control critical infrastructures .... "50 At that time, 
there were only eight sectors considered to be critical. 51 
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the definition was 
expanded to include sectors outside of defense and the economy. Th,e 
Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 broadened the critical 
infrastructure definition to include those "systems and assets, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or 
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact 
on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, 
or any combination of those matters."52 This definition has not changed 
since 2001.53 The number of vital systems since then, however, has 
doubled.54 These systems, which are considered to "provide[ ] the 
essential services that underpin American society and serve as the 
backbone of our nation's economy, security, and health,"55 are divided 
into sixteen sectors: (1) chemical; (2) commercial facilities; (3) 
communications; (4) critical manufacturing; (5) dams; (6) defense 
industrial base; (7) emergency services; (8) energy; (9) financial services; 
48. Id.
49. Exec. Order No. 13010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37347 (July 17, 1996).
50. Id. See also Dorsey Wilkin, et al., Cyberspace Policy for Critical Infrastructures, in
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION II, at 17, 18 (Mauricio Papa & Sujeet Shenoi, eds., 
2008). 
51. Exec. Order No. 13010, supra note 49.
52. Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2012).
53. See generally Wilkin, supra note 50 (detailing the progression of U.S. critical
infrastructure). 
54. See Presidential Policy Directive PPD-21 (Feb. 12, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical­
infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
55. What is Critical Infrastructure?, DEp'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Dec. 8, 2017),
dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure. 
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(10) food and agriculture; (11) government facilities; (12) healthcare and 
public health; (13) information technology; (14) nuclear reactors, 
materials, and waste; (15) transportation systems; and (16) water and 
wastewater systems. 56 
The United Kingdom similarly defines critical infrastructure as: 
those critical elements of infrastructure (namely assets, 
facilities, systems, networks or processes and the 
essential workers that operate and facilitate them), the 
loss or compromise of which could result in: a) major 
detrimental impact on the availability, integrity or 
delivery of essential services-including those services, 
whose integrity, if compromised, could result in 
significant loss of life or casualties-taking into account 
significant economic or social impacts; and/or b) 
significant impact on national security, national defence, 
or the functioning of the state. 57 
Also like the United States, these elements are further divided into 
sectors: "chemicals, civil nuclear, communications, defence, emergency 
services, energy, finance, food, government, health, space, transport, 
and water."58 Communications, emergency services, and transport are 
further divided into sub-sectors, such as broadcast, telecommunications, 
internet, and postal; ambulance, coastguard, fire and rescue, police, 
electricity, gas, and oil; and aviation, ports, rail, and road. 59 
While the United States and the United Kingdom include a wide 
variety of sectors in their critical infrastructure, some countries do not 
have such broad definitions. India, for example, lists "the sectors of 
power, water supply, communications, transportation, defence and 
finance [as] vital constituents of national security."60 Priorities as to 
56. Jeh Johnson, Stat.ement by Secretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election 
Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector, DEp'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 6, 
201 7), https://www .dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/stat.ement-secretary-johnson-designation­
election-infrastructure-critical (Each of the sectors are divided into approximat.ely twenty 
sub-sectors. After this not.e was drafted, the Department of Homeland Security designat.ed 
election infrastructure as a sub-sector of government facilities, establishing such 
infrastructure as critical. Secretary of Homeland Security under President Obama, Jeh 
Johnson, stat.ed that "Given the vital role elections play in this country, it is clear that 
certain syst.ems and assets of election infrastructure meet the definition of critical 
infrastructure, in  fact and in law."). 
57. CABINET OFFICE, SUMMARY OF THE 2015-16 SECTOR RESILIENCE PLANS (2016).
58. Id., at 3.
59. CABINET OFFICE, supra not.e 57, at 6.
60. IDSA TASK FORCE REPORT, INDIA'S CYBER SECURITY CHALLENGE 33 (2012).
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what is critical to a nation-state's survival vary between different 
nation-states, and these discrepancies could lead to confusion or conflict 
regarding what critical infrastructure sectors warrant international 
protection. As threats to critical infrastructure increase in the digital 
world, how a country defines its vital systems will be crucial in 
determining how future international laws are defined and what the 
future rules of engagement may be. 
Threats to Critical Infrastructure in Cyberspace 
In 2015, the United Kingdom determined that the threat of a 
cyberattack on infrastructure was not likely to occur in the next five 
years, and should an attack take place, the impact would not have an 
overall catastrophic impact. 61 Attacks on physical infrastructure or 
transport systems were considered more probable, but the United 
Kingdom believed that there would be no greater impact on the country 
than a cyberattack.62 Since 2015, however, there have been numerous 
attacks on various nation-states' infrastructures. While none have 
seemingly produced catastrophic results, as the number of attacks 
continues to increase, it is simply a matter of time before an attack will 
devastate a country. 
Attacks on critical infrastructure in the physical world have 
devastated civilizations, such as the Roman Empire.63 Nevertheless, 
military attacks are not the only means of affecting critical 
infrastructure. Civil emergencies affecting a country's critical 
infrastructure can stem from accidents-such as technical failures or 
natural disasters. If a technical failure occurs in vital sectors, damage 
can be catastrophic and cause widespread destruction and hundreds of 
deaths. This occurred with the Malpasset dam failure in southern 
France in 1959 that destroyed two small villages and killed over four 
hundred people.64 While this was a technical failure of the dam due to 
physical vulnerabilities, one can imagine how a cyberattack on a 
country's dam system might play out. In 2013 a cyberattack on a New 
York dam managed to access office systems rather than the operational 
systems of the dam.65 Despite the attack's failure to cause any 
61. See CABINET OFFICE, NATIONAL RISK REGISTER OF CML EMERGENCIES 12 (2015)
(hereinafter Register of Civil Emergencies]. 
62. Id.
63. See supra Part II.
64. REGISTER OF CIVIL EMERGENCIES, supra note 61, at 35.
65. See John Bonazw, Cyber Attack on New York Dam Highlights the Dark Side of the
Internet of Things, OBSERVER, (Mar. 10, 2016, 6:00 PM), http://observer.com/2016/03/ 
cyber-a ttack-on-new-york-dam-highlights-the-dark-side-of-the-internet-of-things/; see also 
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destruction, the mere ability to gain access to any part of the system is 
alarming. The increase in technology being used to connect sectors 
within a nation's critical infrastructure increases the attack surface, as 
now malicious actors can "aspire to attack the national infrastructure 
using both traditional methods and more novel methods such as cyber­
attack."66 
In 2016, Verizon Security Solutions released a report disclosing a 
breach of a water company.67 Due to the nature of the breach, Veriwn
opted not to disclose the name of the company nor its location but did 
release details about the breach.68 By infiltrating the water company's 
system, hackers were able to manipulate the chemical levels in the 
water; however, Verizon reported that the manipulations were likely 
unintentional as the hackers went after the customer records. 69 While 
the company managed to reverse the changes before any customers 
were affected by the contaminated water supply, this event illuminates 
how easily a vital system can be affected if a motivated attacker were to 
infiltrate the systems. 
Water supply systems are not the only infrastructure sectors that 
have been targeted in the last few years. Attempted attacks on London's 
electricity substations occurred throughout the 199Os and resulted in 
widespread damage and disruption. 70 These attacks have carried into 
the new millennium with attacks on the energy infrastructure in 
Algeria and Yemen. 71 These attacks were all conducted via physical 
intrusions until recently, as cyberattacks have become increasingly 
common. The best example of this is Russia's consistent attacks on the 
Ukrainian electrical grid over the course of the last few years. 
Russia's cyber-operations against Ukraine have been perhaps the 
strongest indicator of a nation-state's ability to maliciously interfere 
Perez & Prokupecz, supra note 2; Danny Y adron, Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York 
Dam in 2013, WALL STREET JOURNAL, (Dec. 20, 2015, 8:49 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-
1450662559?mg=prod/accounts-wsj. 
66. REGISTER OF CIVIL EMERGENCIES, supra note 61, at 42. 
67. See generally Mary-Ann Russon, Hackers Hijacking Water Treatment Plant 
Controls Shows How Easily Civilians Could be Poisoned, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016, 
4:35 PM), http://www.ibtimes.eo.uk/hackers-hijacked-chemical-controls-water-treatment­
plant-utility-company-was-using-1988-server-1551266 (detailing the cyber-attack on an 
unidentified water plant); Michael Hill, Water Treatment Plant Hit by Cyber-attack, INFO 
SECURITY (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/water-treatment­
plant-hit-by/ (discussing the system vulnerabilities that allowed hackers to infiltrate a 
water plant). 
68. See Russon, supra note 67.
69. See generally id.; see also Hill, supra note 67. 
70. REGISTER OF CML EMERGENCIES, supra note 61, at 47. 
71. Id.
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with another country's critical infrastructure. Since 2014, various 
cyberattacks have been launched against Ukrainian industries, 
including energy companies, railway systems, and television broadcast 
stations.72 Attacks rose in severity in December 2015 when three energy 
companies were infiltrated and the electrical grids were physically 
damaged, which left over two hundred thousand people in Ukraine 
without power.73 Additionally, communication channels were disabled 
and security measures changed, which prevented the companies from 
quickly addressing the blackouts.74 Almost exactly one year later, a 
second attack on Ukraine's power grid occurred.75 During the attack, a 
power station was targeted, one-fifth of Kiev's electrical power was shut 
off, and over one hundred thousand people were without power.76 
Russia's attacks on Ukraine are not limited to the power grid; in 
December 2016, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko reported 6,500 
attacks on thirty-six Ukrainian targets over a period of two months and 
attributed the attacks to Russia. 77 Nearly every sector has been affected 
by cyberattacks, including media, finance, transportation, military, 
politics, and energy. 78 
Attacks like these directly affect the physical world and threaten 
the safety and well-being of civilian populations. While the Ukrainian 
attacks have not resulted in extensive damage, there is concern that 
this is merely a prelude for larger-scale attacks. This fear is not limited 
to attacks by Russia. Many of these cyberattacks on infrastructure 
systems are thought to be testing grounds for experimenting with new 
methods of attacking vulnerable targets and seeing how a nation-state 
will respond. These attacks "can be conceived and planned without 
detectable logistic preparation. They can be invisibly reconnoitered, 
clandestinely rehearsed, and then mounted in a matter of minutes or 
even seconds without revealing the identity and location of the 
attacker."79 As Phil Lancombe, the former staff director of the 
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, has 
72. See generally Scott J. Shackelford, et al., From Russia With Love: Understanding
the Russian Cyber Threat to U.S. Critical Infrastructure and What to Do About It, 96 NEB. 
L. REV. 320, 324-36 (2017) (providing a brief history of the Ukraine grid hacks and the
effects arising from the cyber-attacks).




77. Andy Greenberg, How an Entire Nation &came Russia's Test Lab for Cyberwar,
WIRED (June 20, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack­
ukraine/. 
78. Id.
79. BROWN, supra note 23, at 129.
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stated, if a malicious actor can find a way to attack the United States 
without passing the "threshold of provocation that would evoke a 
'Desert Storm kind of response,"' then the United States is put "in the 
position of not being able to assert its own will."80 This is not a 
sentiment that is limited only to the United States; it may be the 
position in which many countries will find themselves as attacks on 
critical infrastructures increase. 
The International Community's Approach to Critical Infrastructure in 
Cyberspace 
The international community has taken steps, both as individual 
nation-states and as a larger entity, to ensure protections from 
cyberattacks. In the past few years, for example, China has reached 
agreements with both Canada and the United States promising that 
neither party will commit cyber-espionage on the other.81 But these 
agreements are limited to the private sector and acts of espionage for 
economic or intellectual property purposes.82 While these agreements 
have successfully deterred economically motivated cyberattacks, 83 they 
are merely an important first step toward an international "rules of 
conduct" for cyberspace, not the final step. 
Norms for critical infrastructure protection during times of peace 
have been proposed and adopted within the international community. 
Those norms that have been adopted can be a starting point to a more 
fully developed Digital Geneva Convention. A 2015 U.N. report found 
the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) in 
targeting "critical infrastructure and associated information systems of 
a State" to be a serious and real threat.84 Furthermore, it identified the 
"dramatic increase in incidents involving the malicious use of ICTs by 
80. Id. at 50.
81. See China, Canada Vow Not to Conduct Cyber Attacks on Private Sector, REUTERS, 
June 25, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-china-cyber/china-canada-vow­
not-to-conduct-cyber-attacks-on-private-sector-idUSKBNl9H06A; see also Doug Olenick, 




83. See generally Adam Segal, The U.S.-China Cyber Espionage Deal One Year Later,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-china-cyber­
espionage-deal-one-year-later (discussing the success that the United States-China 
Agreement has seen since implementation). 
84. U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on 
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security, ,i 5, U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015) [hereinafter Report of 
GGE]. 
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State and non-state actors" as a disturbing trend that creates risks for 
all nation-states.85 The U.N. Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)
recommended "a State should not conduct or knowingly support ICT 
activity that intentionally damages or otherwise impairs the use and 
operation of critical infrastructure."86 The GGE report also encouraged
nation-states to incorporate a "national computer emergency response 
team and/or cybersecurity incident response team" as a part of the 
critical infrastructure.87 The report, however, does not define what
constitutes critical infrastructure. 
REDEFINING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR A GLOBAL APPLICATION 
If the international community is going to take on the mantel of 
protecting civilians by protecting nation-states' critical infrastructures, 
it will need to redefine what institutions are vital to a nation-state. The 
"growing dependence on computer networks by critical infrastructure 
systems"88 requires nation-states and the international community as a
whole to determine what protections these intangible systems should be 
given. The "growth in the complexity of computer-based systems,"89
which often form the backbone of the physical critical infrastructures of 
nation-states, has outpaced the development of security measures. 
These discrepancies "make[ ] these systems increasingly vulnerable to 
programming errors and bugs, as well as to malicious abuse and 
exploitation"90 and must be addressed as a part of international norms 
establishing protections for critical infrastructure. The GGE report calls 
for potentially broadening critical infrastructures by adding "incident 
response team[s]"91 to those systems vital to the functioning of a nation­
state. The United States and the United Kingdom seem to follow this 
reasoning and have incorporated cybersecurity, while not directly into 
the critical infrastructure system as its own sector, as a vital part of 
defense. 
In response to the Cyberspace Policy Review in 2009, conducted to 
provide a comprehensive assessment of U.S. cybersecurity policies,92
85. Id. ,r 3.
86. Id. at 2; see also Shackelford, supra note 72 at 334.
87. Report ofGGE, supra note 84 at 10.
88. Oren Gross, Cyber Responsibility to Protect: Legal Obligations of States Directly
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President Barack Obama stated "our digital infrastructure-the 
networks and computers we depend on every day-will be treated as 
they should be: a strategic national asset. Protecting this infrastructure 
will be a national security priority."93 In 2010, "[d]uring a time of
significantly reduced budgets," "the United Kingdom opted to forego the 
production of aircraft capable aircraft carriers and allocate those 
resources to expanding and maintaining its cyber defense."94 This move
further emphasized the shift of nation-states' priorities away from 
protecting physical systems to protecting intangible infrastructures. In
2015, the U.K. government budgeted £1.9 billion over the next five years 
for cyber-defense.95 
While nation-states recognize the need to protect their critical 
infrastructures from cyberattacks, ''budgetary constraints and resource 
limitations have made it impractical to protect every single asset."96 As 
individual nation-states begin (or continue) to prioritize protecting their 
critical infrastructure through cyber-defense, international treatises 
and reports will continue trying to establish cyberrwrms to govern this 
new territory.97 These established norms, however, ignore how norms
naturally develop. The ideas for cybernorms "conceptualize norms as 
products, focusing on what norms should say rather than how they will
work."98 Establishing accepted norms does not work by defining how a 
group should act and then implementing them onto a society. 
Norms are not deracinated abstractions; they do not come about by 
fiat or desire, and they are never imposed in a vacuum. Norms are social 
creatures that grow out of specific contexts via social processes and 
interactions among particular groups of actors. Understanding both 
those contexts and those processes is as important to successful norm 
construction as agreeing on content. 99 
The international community should look within these contexts and 
nation-state interactions for guidance in creating the new cyberspace 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the__press_office/advisorstoconductimmediatecybersecurityrevi 
ew. 
93. Eric Jensen, Responses to the Ten Questwns, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5049, 5050 
(2011). 
94. Id. at 5050-51.
95. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY REVIEW, 
HM GoVERNMENT at 40 (2015). 
96. Christine lzuakor & Richard White, Critical Infrastructure Asset Identification, in
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION X, at 27 (Mason Rice & Sujeet Shenoi, eds., 2016).
97. See generally Martha Finnemore & Duncan B. Hollis, Constructing Norms for
Global Cybersecurity, 110 AM. J. INT'L L. 425, 426 (2016) (discussing the implementation of 
social norms in cyberspace). 
98. Id. at 427.
99. Id.
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norms. 
These internationally determined norms, if created in a vacuum 
without context, will eventually conflict with nation-states' beliefs and 
priorities. If the international community, whether through the United 
Nations or another international body, continues to develop and 
implement cybernorms "as products,"100 future successes may 
potentially be hindered by individual nation-states' competing interests 
and priorities. 
A better solution to balancing international norms and individual 
sovereignty may be to establish a globally accepted definition of what 
constitutes critical infrastructure. A singular definition could be used in 
international agreements or conventions to protect civilians in both 
times of peace and war. Like the Protocols Additional to the Geneva 
Convention in 1977 banned attacks that would affect civilians by 
depleting food stores or destroying places of worship, 101 these new 
agreements could prohibit attacks on systems that are included in a 
global definition of critical infrastructure. 
In determining what criteria would form the basis of this new 
definition, basic necessities should be considered, such as protecting 
food stores and water supplies. Additionally, the systems that aim to 
protect civilians from continuing harm or devastation should be 
included, such as emergency services. If the purpose of a global 
definition of critical infrastructure is to ensure civilian protections at an 
international level, there must be limits to what is considered vital as to 
not impede a nation-state's ability to wage war if necessary. Prohibiting 
attacks on current critical infrastructures would theoretically protect 
military targets, like nuclear facilities and defense. While this would be 
ideal, enforcement of such a bar would be nearly impossible. 
Critical infrastructure at a global level should encompass systems 
where, if substantially or completely destroyed, the basic survival of 
civilians would be in peril. This single, global definition would protect 
critical infrastructures that are necessary and vital to the survival of 
civilians rather than that of a nation-state. As priorities may change for 
what a nation-state considers critical, expanding as technology allows 
and encompassing more as critical, this definition can remain static. 
Consider the U.S. sectors that comprise its critical infrastructures­
including commercial facilities. This sector consists of eight subsectors, 
such as entertainment and media, gaming, and sports leagues.102 While 
attacks on any of these subsectors would be devastating, and in fact 
100. See id.
101. See Protocols, supra not.e 32; see also supra Part II.
102. Commercial Facilities Sector, DEp'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
https://www.dhs.gov/commercial-facilities-sector# (last visit.ed Aug. 23, 2018). 
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have been in the past, they do not pose a continuous civilian threat like 
an attack on a country's electric grid or water supply. 
Furthermore, this new definition would neither be a replacement of 
existing definitions of critical infrastructure nor affect nation-states' 
abilities to expand their own definitions. Rather, it would act as an 
overarching, supplemental definition, in a vein similar to the European 
Union's structure for critical infrastructure protection. Each Member 
State is responsible for its own critical infrastructure, but the European 
Union has created overarching standards.1°3 While each Member State 
must establish defensive measures for its own critical infrastructure, 
the European Union has established minimum standards of conduct for 
those instances where a system disruption would substantially affect 
more than one Member State.104 Applying a similar idea to a definition 
of critical infrastructure and using the goals of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, this single definition can be designed and used in future 
international agreements. 
CONCLUSION 
Critical infrastructure is a catchphrase that has been bandied about 
since the mid-1990s. It is a term that is used frequently and is not 
always well-defined. Throughout history, nation-states have developed 
and protected systems that they have found vital to their survival and 
success. The definition of what is critical, however, has not remained 
static through time; rather, it has evolved as needs and technologies 
have changed. Now the world is at a turning point. Society has 
progressed, and technology has become so advanced that vital systems 
are reliant on one another and nation-states are dependent on each 
other. Perhaps even more alarming is that the threat is no longer 
visible. As Oren Gross states, "[c]omputer networks and information 
and communication technologies constitute the nerve system of modern 
society," 105 and these technologies now control, if not make up, the 
critical infrastructures of many nation-states. These systems are 
vulnerable to attack and are easily manipulated; perpetrators can 
103. See generally Council Directive 2008/114/EC, of the Council of the European Union
of 8 Dec. 2008 on the Identification and Designation of European Critical Infrastructures 
and the Assessment of the Need to Improve Their Protection, 2008 O.J. (L 345) 75 
(detailing the procedures for setting standards for critical infrastructure within Member 
States and the European Union). 
104. See generally id.; see also lzuakor & White, supra note 96, at 29 (discussing the
European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection guidelines for fulfilling the 
requirements of the European Council Directives). 
105. See Gross, supra note 88 at 481.
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devastate a country's civilian population with a few keystrokes while 
oceans away. 
These new threat vectors have brought the international community 
together to establish new rules of engagement in an effort of protecting 
vital systems of nation-states. However, because those systems that 
constitute critical infrastructure and priorities differ throughout the 
world, a new, singular definition of what comprises critical 
infrastructure is warranted. Thus, rather than extend protections to an 
ever-changing and inconsistent framework of systems, the international 
community should redefine and establish an overarching definition to 
protect civilians from threats that could cause immediate and 
continuing devastation. 
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